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“Sense of control” refers to the subjective feeling of control over external events.
Numerous neuropsychological studies have investigated the neural basis of the sense
of control during action performance; however, most previous studies have focused
on responses to a single discrete action outcome rather than real-time processing of
action-outcome sequences. In the present study, we aimed to identify whether certain
patterns of brain activation are associated with the perceived control during continuous
movement. We recorded electroencephalography (EEG) signals while participants
continuously moved a right-handed mouse in an attempt to control multiple visual
stimuli. When participants perceived a sense of control over the stimuli, we observed a
positive potential approximately 550 ms after the onset of movement, while no similar
potential was observed when participants reported a lack of control. The appearance
of this potential was consistent with the time window of awareness of control in
a behavioral test using the same task, and likely reflected the explicit allocation of
attention to control. Moreover, we found that the alpha-mu rhythm, which is linked
to sensorimotor processing, was significantly suppressed after participants came to
a conclusion regarding the level of control, regardless of whether control or lack of
control was perceived. In summary, our results suggest that the late positive potential
after the onset of the movement and the suppression of alpha-mu rhythm can be used
as markers of the perception of control during continuous action performance and
feedback monitoring.
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INTRODUCTION
‘‘Sense of control’’ refers to the subjective feeling of being in control of one’s own actions and their
effects on external events. In psychosocial terms, a sense of control is important for understanding
and interpreting changes in the external environment, and for behavioral adaptation in response
to such changes. Generally, a sense of control emerges from the appropriate linkage of motor
command-based predictions and actual sensory feedback, whereas a delusion of control arises from
a failure to internally represent the predicted consequence of an action (i.e., the comparator model,
Frith et al., 2000a,b).
Previous studies have investigated the brain regions and activation patterns associated with the
sense of control. For instance, with respect to the comparator model, the right posterior parietal
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cortex (Fink et al., 1999; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Blakemore and
Sirigu, 2003; Farrer et al., 2003, 2008; Yomogida et al., 2010)
and pre-supplementary motor area (Moore et al., 2010; Tsakiris
et al., 2010; Yomogida et al., 2010) have been associated with
discrepancies between intended movements and actual sensory
feedback. Further, electroencephalography (EEG) studies have
indicated that the N1 component—a negative potential occurring
approximately 100 ms after stimulus onset—is attenuated during
self-produced or predicted events, relative to that observed
during externally generated feedback (Kühn et al., 2011; Gentsch
et al., 2012; Timm et al., 2014). Moreover, the sense of control has
been associated with enhancements in feedback correct-related
positivity (fCRP, a positive potential occurring approximately
225 ms post-stimulus) and attenuations in P3a (a positive
potential occurring approximately 350 ms post-stimulus; Kühn
et al., 2011; Bednark and Franz, 2014). Notably, most of these
previous studies compared brain activity in response to sensory
feedback between conditions that did or did not produce a sense
of control. However, no studies to date have examined such
differences in the experience of control during continuous action
performance.
In everyday life, control over novel external objects is
usually determined based on feedback received in response to
repeated action performance. Previous studies have suggested
that perceptual motor control is triggered by goal-level control,
and that the sense of agency (i.e., the feeling of being the
agent of control) exhibits a hierarchical relationship with the
perceived level of control (Kumar and Srinivasan, 2014, 2017).
Additional research has suggested that this sense of agency is
dependent upon real-time monitoring of the level of control
(Caspar et al., 2016). In the present study, we aimed to identify
whether certain patterns of brain activation are associated with
the level of perceived control, and to determine whether activity
associated with successful matching between sensory feedback
and actions can be used as a marker of the sense of control. To
achieve the aforementioned aims, we designed a task in which
participants continuously moved a mouse to determine whether
or not they had control over several dots on a computer screen.
We compared EEG signals during the mouse movement between
conditions during which control was and was not experienced.
One previous study suggested that the sense of control
enhances self-recognition by attracting attention, in what is
known as the ‘‘self pop-out’’ effect (Salomon et al., 2013).
Therefore, we predicted that attention related potentials, such
as P300, might be triggered by the perception of control during
movement. We calculated event-related potentials (ERPs) after
the onset of movement within the time windows in which
the sense of control probably emerged. In another previous
study, Kang et al. (2015) combined EEG measurement with
virtual reality, observing a decrease in alpha band power when
participants had higher levels of control over a virtual hand.
This finding indicate that alpha-mu suppression (Chatrian et al.,
1959), may be associated with the sense of control. Therefore,
we measured the alpha-mu rhythm at the C3 electrode and
compared it between control conditions, as previous studies
have reported that alpha-mu suppression originates in the
left hemisphere (Bai et al., 2005) and can be detected at the
C3 electrode during right hand movement (Oberman et al., 2005;
Ulloa and Pineda, 2007; Woodruff et al., 2011).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The present study included two tasks: an EEG measurement
task and a behavioral task. Thirteen right-handed students with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in the EEG
measurement task (mean age = 23.4 ± 2.1 years), nine of
whom also participated in the behavioral experiment (mean
age = 24.1± 2.0 years). As we did not examine mouse movement
during EEG measurement, 10 additional participants (mean
age = 22.3 ± 2.1 years) performed the EEG task without
undergoing EEG measurement. The study was approved by the
ethics committee of the School of Engineering at the University
of Tokyo. Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants prior to study participation.
Task and Procedure
Visual stimuli were displayed on a 597 mm × 336 mm
(1920 × 1080 pixels) LCD screen, which was positioned
approximately 50 cm from the participant’s head. Head
movement and viewing distance were not restricted. The
stimuli were presented on a 32-bit Windows workstation using
MATLAB (2016a; The Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA, USA)
equipped with Psychtoolbox. For each trial (Figure 1), a blank
gray screen was presented for 500 ms, following which a gray
background containing a fixation cross and 12 black dots
(3-mm) was presented for 1500 ms. The dots appeared at
random positions within a 4◦ visual angle and remained static
until the participant moved a mouse with his or her right
hand. In half of the trials (the self-control condition), one
of the dots moved in correspondence with the direction and
speed of the mouse movement, while the other dots moved
at the same speed but in random directions. The computer-
generated random movements changed direction frequently
and thus appeared very different from movements initiated by
participants. In the remaining trials (the non-control condition),
all dots moved in random directions when themouse wasmoved,
such that participants were not granted a sense of control.
Dots disappeared if they moved beyond the (approximate) 4◦
visual angle and appeared again if they re-entered the 4◦ visual
angle.
For each behavioral session, participants were instructed to
gaze at the fixation cross and to pay attention to all of the moving
dots using their peripheral vision, avoiding eye movements or
blinking during the trial. Participants were instructed to begin
moving the mouse immediately after the dots appeared on the
screen, and to click the mouse as soon as they realized whether or
not they were able to control the movement of any of the dots.
Participants were instructed to move the mouse freely, but to
avoid large unidirectional movements that might move the dot
outside of the visible area (within a 4◦ visual angle). Participants
were also encouraged to make smooth movements such as circles
rather than small shakingmotions to avoid sudden changes in the
visual stimuli. Participants were allowed to familiarize themselves
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FIGURE 1 | Timeline of a trial in the electroencephalography (EEG) task. At the beginning of each trial, a blank screen was presented for 500 ms, following which a
central fixation cross and 12 surrounding black dots were displayed. The dots moved in correspondence with the onset and offset of mouse movement. In the
self-control condition, one dot moved in correspondence with the direction and speed of mouse movement, while the other dots moved in random directions. In the
non-control condition, all dots moved in random directions, independently of the direction or speed of mouse movement. Participants moved the mouse freely for
1500 ms, following which they were asked to orally report their sense of control over the dots with a “yes” or “no” response.
with the motions of the mouse at liberty prior to practice
sessions to ensure their ability to easily to determine whether
they had control over the dots (no response was required). The
dots disappeared from the screen 500 ms after clicking, and
participants orally reported their experience of control over the
dots with a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ response at the end of each trial.
The task itself contained 80 trials (40 trials in each condition).
Participants completed 20 practice trials before the task. No
feedback was provided during the practice or actual trials, and
the order in which the trials were presented was randomized.
EEG measurement trials utilized the same stimuli and
instructions regarding mouse movement as the behavioral task,
except that participants were not instructed to click the mouse at
any point. In each trial, the fixation cross and dots disappeared
1500 ms after stimulus onset. Thus, participants only reported
their experience of control over the dots with an oral ‘‘yes’’ or
‘‘no’’ response. The EEG task also contained 80 trials (40 trials in
each condition).
Each EEG session was conducted for a single participant
at a time in a quiet, electrically sheltered room. After being
fitted with the EEG device and receiving an explanation of
the task, participants completed 20 practice trials. Before each
trial, the experimenter orally reminded participants that the trial
was about to start and observed the electrooculography (EOG)
data. When a steady level of EOG activity was obtained, the
experimenter started the trial. After each trial, the experimenter
recorded the participant’s oral responses regarding his or her
sense of control. Participants were encouraged to blink their
eyes between trials, and were given short breaks after every
10–20 trials or in response to unsteady EOG data to prevent eye
fatigue. The EEG task was performed before the behavioral task
for those individuals participating in both tasks.
EEG Recording and Analysis
EEG data were obtained at a sampling rate of 512 Hz
using an active EEG electrode system g.GAMMAsys (g.tec
Medical Engineering GmbH, Austria) fitted onto a cap that
was individually sized for each participant. MATLAB Simulink
(R2014a) equipped with the Signal Processing Toolbox and DSP
System Toolbox was used for recording. Electrodes were placed
at Fp1, Fp2, F7, F3, F4, F8, FC5, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC6, T7, C3,
C1, Cz, C2, C4, T8, CP5, CP1, CPz, CP2, CP6, P7, P3, Pz, P4,
P8, O1 and O2 in accordance with the extended 10–20 system.
Vertical and horizontal EOG data were recorded via electrodes
attached below and lateral to the outer canthi of the right eye.
All EEG recording electrodes were injected with conductive
electrode gel, and electrode impedances were transformed to
output impedances of 1 kΩ by the active electrodes. The ground
and reference electrodes were placed at Fz and the right earlobe,
respectively. An online band filter of 0.1–100 Hz and a notch
filter of 50 Hz were applied during EEG recording.
Trials with incorrect agency responses or EOG voltage
variations exceeding ±40 µV were excluded from the ERP
analysis. Because each trial lasted only 1500 ms, participants
were typically able to avoid eye blinking and eye movements in
most trials. As a result, only 6.15% of trials were excluded from
analysis. Movement onset time-locked ERPs were calculated
using MATLAB (2016a). A low-pass Butterworth filter of 30 Hz
and a 200-ms pre-movement baseline correction were applied
offline.
Trials with EOG voltages exceeding ±40 µV were excluded
from the time-frequency analysis, and no further filter was
applied to the data. The time-frequency analysis was conducted
via a Morlet wavelet time-frequency transformation using the
MATLAB wavelet toolbox (R2016a). We used wavelets with a
6-cycle width and frequencies ranging from 1 Hz to 60 Hz with
varied scales (with a better scale resolution but poorer frequency
resolution for lower frequencies, and vice versa for higher
frequencies). The wavelet transform was applied to continuous
signals from all trials for each participant to avoid the edge
effect (i.e., distortion near the start and end of a given time-
window). Power was defined as the square of the absolute value of
the wavelet coefficient, and was normalized by dividing changes
from baseline (50–250 ms prior to each trial) by the standard
deviation of power within each trial period. Negative values
indicated suppression from baseline.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
We conducted behavioral sessions to examine the time course
of the experience of control and identify a time-window of
focus for the EEG task. Mean latency to click responses was
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763 ± 117 ms and 1036 ± 223 ms after the initiation of
mouse movement in the self-control and non-control conditions
(incorrect trials excluded), respectively. The difference between
control conditions was significant (t(8) = 4.65, p = 0.002,
Cohen’d = 1.55). According to Libet’s theory regarding the
temporal features of the intention to act vs. the initiation of
voluntary action, the interval between awareness of a desire
to act and actual action is approximately 200 ms (Libet,
1999). Thus, our findings suggest that participants came to a
conclusion regarding their level of control 560 and 830 ms
after the initiation of mouse movement in the self-control
and non-control conditions, respectively. We used these time
windows to examine whether brain activity changed along with
the awareness of control. However, since we were unable to
control for or measure individual differences and inter-trial
variability, these time windows do not provide precise temporal
information regarding the experience of control, but rather
provide a rough division between pre- and post-sense-of-control
states. In addition, response accuracy regarding control was
99.6% ± 0.6% and 99.2% ± 1.4% in the behavioral and EEG
tasks, respectively.
ERPs
We calculated ERPs after movement onset to verify the critical
aspects of perceptual and attentional processes during the
generation of sense of control. Trials with incorrect responses
regarding the level of control were excluded. Figure 2 shows
the grand average ERPs of electrodes along the midline (FCz,
Cz, CPz and Pz) to the onset of movement in the two
conditions of the EEG task. An obvious positive potential
with a peak around 550 ms after the onset of movement
was observed in the self-control condition but not in the
non-control condition. This potential was designated ‘‘P500’’.
The scalp topography of the P500 potential is illustrated in
Figure 3. A 2 × 4 (control × electrode) repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on peak amplitude values of P500
(450–650 ms after the onset of movement) at FCz, Cz, CPz and
Pz revealed a significant main effect of control (F(1,12) = 13.14,
p = 0.003, η2p = 0.523), while there was no main effect of
electrode or interaction between control response and electrode
(F(3,36) = 0.84, p = 0.479, η2p = 0.066; F(3,36) = 2.05, p = 0.124,
η2p = 0.146, respectively). Higher P500 amplitudes were observed
in the self-control condition than in the non-control condition.
Importantly, the peak latency of P500 was consistent with the
approximate time window during which the sense of control
developed, suggesting that the P500 potential is associated with
control-triggered attention.
We also examined whether lack of perceived control was
associated with a specific potential within the corresponding
time window. Therefore, we compared the positive and negative
peaks 630–1130 ms after the onset of movement between the
self-control and non-control conditions by conducting the same
2 × 4 repeated-measures ANOVAs as previously mentioned.
No main effect of control response was observed for either the
FIGURE 2 | Grand average event-related potentials (ERPs) in self-control and non-control trials from 300 ms before the onset of mouse movement to 1200 ms after
onset for electrodes along the midline.
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FIGURE 3 | Topographical maps of peak amplitudes for the P500 component
in the self-control condition.
positive (F(1,12) = 0.027, p = 0.871, η2p = 0.002) or negative peak
in this time window (F(1,12) = 1.95, p = 0.188, η2p = 0.140),
suggesting that lack of perceived control was not associated with
any attention-related potentials.
Time-Frequency Analysis
Figure 4 shows the mean time-frequency power to the onset
of movement in the non-control and self-control conditions at
the C3 electrode. We first compared alpha-mu activity between
the self-control and non-control conditions for the whole trial.
Our findings indicated that suppression of alpha-mu activity was
stronger in the self-control condition than in the non-control
condition (t(12) = 2.42, p = 0.033, Cohen’s d = 0.670). Further, in
order to examine whether alpha-mu activity is associated with the
experience of control or non-control, we used the approximate
time windows of pre-control/non-control and post-control/non-
control (i.e., before and after 560 and 830 ms of movement
for the self-control and non-control conditions, respectively). A
2 × 2 (control × period) repeated measures ANOVA revealed
a significant main effect of period (F(1,12) = 15.125, p = 0.002,
η2p = 0.558). Surprisingly, however, no significant main effect
of control or interaction between control and period was
observed (F(1,12) = 2.77, p = 0.112, η2p = 0.187; F(1,12) = 0.407,
p = 0.536, η2p = 0.033, respectively). These findings suggest that
suppression of alpha-mu activity was stronger when participants
became aware of their level of control, regardless of whether
they perceived that they had or did not have control over the
stimuli.
We conducted an additional behavioral task involving 10 new
participants to examine whether mouse movement differed
between self-control and non-control conditions (as we did not
do so during the original EEG task). Our results indicated that
participants moved the mouse less in the self-control condition
than in the non-control condition (t(9) = 4.33, p = 0.002). Such
findings suggest that participants moved the mouse with greater
intention to confirm their lack of control once they had achieved
awareness.
Additionally, an increase in the power of the delta/theta band
(1–7 Hz) was observed in the self-control condition relative to
the non-control condition at the central, central-parietal and
parietal regions (including C3, C1, C1, Cz, C4, CP5, CP1, CPz,
CP2, CP6, P7, P3, Pz, P4 and P8). As previous research has
indicated that increases in lower frequency band power are likely
associated with differences in ERPs between conditions (Roach
and Mathalon, 2008), we do not discuss these results further.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we utilized EEG to examine the perception
of control during continuous movement. We designed an
experimental task in which participants continuously moved a
mouse with their right hand in order to determine whether they
FIGURE 4 | Average spectral power of 1–60 Hz frequency bands at the C3 electrode time-locked to movement onset in non-control and self-control trials. The
contrast between the conditions is also shown.
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had control over the stimuli. In the behavioral experiment, the
average response time to determine the level of control was
763 and 1036 ms in the self-control and non-control conditions,
respectively. These findings suggest that, after accounting for
the temporal features of the intention to act in relation to the
initiation of action, participants made conclusions regarding
the level of control at approximately 560 and 830 ms after
the onset of continuous movement in the self-control and
non-control conditions, respectively. A positive ERP with a
peak amplitude appearing about 550 ms after the onset of
mouse movement was observed in the self-control condition.
This ERP was likely associated with control-triggered attention.
Moreover, time-frequency analysis revealed that, although
alpha-mu activity was lower overall for self-control trials than
non-control trials, alpha-mu activity decreased significantly after
the participants became aware of their level of control in both
conditions.
The present study was also the first to examine ERPs
associated with the sense of control during continuous
movement. Previous ERP studies have reported that
self-generated or self-contributed events result in the attenuation
of the N1 and P3 potentials (Kühn et al., 2011; Gentsch et al.,
2012; Timm et al., 2014). These two potentials are associated
with unexpected outcomes and have thus been linked to agency
errors. In contrast, we focused on components associated with
the awareness of control during continuous movement rather
than the sensory processing of a single discrete action outcome.
Our findings of P500 suggest that attention and attention-related
brain activity can be used as markers of the sense of control,
as no such activity was observed when participants perceived a
lack of control. Further, our findings indicated that people likely
pay greater attention on an object that is under control than
uncontrollable objects. However, further studies are required
to elucidate the neural processes underlying the association
between attention and sense of control.
Furthermore, our findings demonstrated that alpha-mu
suppression/desynchronization during continuous movement
was associated with the experience of control, regardless of
whether participants actually had control over the movement.
Alpha-mu event-related desynchronization can be induced by
motor preparation (Leocani et al., 1997; Cochin et al., 1999;
Ramoser et al., 2000; Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004; Pineda,
2005) and selective attention (Van Winsun et al., 1984; Dujardin
et al., 1993; Suffczynski et al., 2001; Polich, 2007). In general,
desynchronization begins 2 s before movement onset over
the contralateral sensorimotor cortex (Pineda, 2005), and the
magnitude of alpha-mu rhythm desynchronization reflects task
complexity as well as the brain areas involved (Boiten et al., 1992;
Dujardin et al., 1995). Our additional behavioral results indicated
that participants moved the mouse less during the self-control
condition than during the non-control condition, indicating that
they engaged in more careful motor planning after becoming
aware of control. Thus, stronger alpha-mu suppression may be
the result of more accurate and intentional motion planning after
people came to a conclusion regarding the level of control.
In summary, the present study is the first to examine the
neural mechanisms underlying the experience of control during
continuous movement. Our data highlight two EEG features
associated with the perception of control: a positive potential
appearing approximately 550 ms after the onset of movement,
which is presumed to reflect increases in attention triggered by
the awareness of control, and enhancements in alpha-mu rhythm
desynchronization, which were associated with awareness of both
control and lack of control. We believe that our findings are
important for understanding the neural basis of the sense of
control may be useful for decoding neural signals associated
with the perception of control in future machine learning
studies.
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